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14 January 1965

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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CONTENTS

1. France - West Germany: De Gaulle and Erhard apparently regard their meeting next week as opportunity to consolidate recent improvement in relations between Paris and Bonn. (Page 1)
2. UK - Libya: Britain may retain limited military presence in Tripoli despite plans for troop withdrawal this year. (Page 2)
3. Burundi: Radicals and moderates struggling for key posts in new government. (Page 3)
4. USSR: Issue of economic priorities for 1965 probably still unresolved. (Page 4)
5. Note: Nationalist China. (Page 5)

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France - West Germany: President de Gaulle and Chancellor Erhard apparently regard their meeting next week as an opportunity to consolidate the recent improvement in relations between France and West Germany.

De Gaulle has agreed to Erhard's request that the initial phase of their meeting be private. The normal procedure under the Franco-German treaty is for ministerial consultations to be conducted at the same time. De Gaulle has also sought to give the meeting a sense of intimacy by inviting Erhard to the relatively secluded chateau at Rambouillet where he formerly held private talks with Adenauer.

De Gaulle will attempt to exploit the successful resolution of the Common Market grain price issue and German disappointment over the suspension of the MLF negotiations. He probably intends to press for closer Franco-German collaboration which is the foundation of his concept for European cooperation.

With the Bundestag elections now less than a year away, Erhard is also eager to promote Franco-German amity. He can be expected to seek De Gaulle's support, in principle, for both German reunification and the specific plan for European unity advanced by Bonn last fall.

Although French officials have criticized some aspects of Bonn's proposals on this question, they are in fact sufficiently close to Paris' views that De Gaulle should have no difficulty in agreeing that an early meeting of the six EEC foreign ministers should consider them.

UK-Libya: [Britain may retain a limited military presence in Tripoli, despite current plans to withdraw the British regiment stationed there by the end of the year.]

[The planned withdrawal is largely an economy move, but it is also calculated to help Britain's prospects for retaining the important air base at El Adem.]

[King Idris, however, has asked the British to remain, and London is giving sympathetic consideration to his request. The British plan to rotate company-sized contingents between Tripoli and Malta on ostensible training missions.]

[Meanwhile, the British are willing to keep their troops in Cyrenaica to protect Libya's eastern border.]

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Burundi: Radical and moderate elements are engaged in a struggle over the composition of a new Burundi government.

Last week the King dismissed the radical-dominated cabinet and named a moderate leader to form a new one. Ousted prime minister Nyamoya had been working closely with the Congolese rebels and with Chinese Communist diplomats.

The basically pro-Western King apparently reacted to growing pressures to change these policies. He also seemed to fear that the old policies might provoke Tshombé to retaliate, and probably is personally worried over the influence of the Chinese.

Political differences are intensified because they follow tribal lines. The majority Hutus are generally more moderate than the Tutsis. The dismissed Nyamoya was a Tutsi and the new appointee is a Hutu, but the King probably will continue his efforts to balance the government between the two peoples.

According to the US Embassy in Bujumbura, the more extreme Tutsi leaders are holding private meetings and seeking to enlist the sympathies of the army and gendarmerie in the hope of securing some key positions in the new government. The embassy believes that a coup against the monarchy, though unlikely, cannot be ruled out. [redacted]

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USSR: The issue of economic priorities for 1965 is probably still unresolved.

The principal state investment in the important chemical industry is now planned to increase by only 255 million rubles this year over 1964, according to the 6 January issue of Economic Gazette. Figures issued a year ago indicated that a 665 million ruble increase had been scheduled for 1965.

This sharp reduction was not reflected in Premier Kosygin's 9 December report on the 1965 economic plan, suggesting that the decision was made after that date. Kosygin noted that "it is planned to increase the growth rate of capital investment in the chemical industry." The implication was that investment growth this year would exceed that achieved in 1964 over 1963. Although the 1964 increase is not known, it probably was near the planned 645 million rubles.

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NOTE

Nationalist China: Chiang Ching-kuo's appointment yesterday as minister of national defense is another step toward his possible succession to leadership of Nationalist China. The new position will permit Chiang Ching-kuo, who has previously operated behind the scenes, to come into public view and gain prestige. The appointment will strengthen his hand in dealing with morale problems and in countering any attempt in the armed forces to stage a coup.

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